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Abstract 
 
China’s censorship infrastructure is widely 
recognized as sophisticated, strict, and 
comprehensive. We conducted a qualitative study to 
understand Chinese citizens’ practices to navigate 
the censored Chinese Internet. We found that 
participants’ practices were closely related to their 
understanding of and resistance to the censorship 
infrastructure. Participants switched between public 
and private channels based on the information they 
desired to seek. They communicated in ways that 
were considered less vulnerable to censorship 
examination. They broadened their information 
search to mitigate the impact of censored content 
consumption. Through these practices, participants 
reportedly coped with the censorship infrastructure 
in an effective manner. We discuss how this case of 
resistance to censorship in China may further our 
understanding of such infrastructure. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
China is widely known for its comprehensive, 
strict Internet censorship infrastructure [23,34]. In a 
top-down manner, the Chinese central government 
required that internet companies block keywords, 
delete unfavorable contents, and ban infringing users 
[3,21]. By imposing hefty penalties for non-
complying organizations, and without providing clear 
censorship parameters, these entities (e.g. , 
microblogs, news sites, and social-networking sites) 
are encouraged to develop strict algorithms which 
filter results with broad strokes, thus resulting in a 
highly restricted informational spaces [13,21]. 
We carried out a qualitative study to understand 
how Chinese citizens resisted the censorship 
infrastructure. We conducted 32 semi-structured 
interviews with mainland Chinese citizens, and also 
observed their discussions on social media. All these 
interviewees had discussed three recent political 
events in the Chinese social media: The Umbrella 
Movement, the National People’s Congress, and the 
crackdown on corruption. By focusing on these 
highly politicized events, we had opportunities to 
sample more instances of resistance in our data.  
We found that participants’ many practices to 
deal with censorship involved their understanding of 
how the Internet censorship functioned as an 
infrastructure. We found a variety of strategies which 
usually included users attempting to understand 
boundaries, mechanics, and intents of censorship. In 
turn, they took measures to avoid, or embrace 
censorship, hopefully,  to make the best of a 
restrictive informational environment. We discuss the 
relationship between repression, censorship, and 
resistance through the infrastructure lens. 
 
2. Background  
 
China has one of the most sophisticated, strict, 
and comprehensive censorship systems in the world 
that regulates its Internet infrastructure [21,23]. 
Among the most well-known of China’s censorship 
apparatuses include the Great Firewall, which is the 
primary technical means of restricting information 
access at the infrastructure level, which includes 
blocking undesirable foreign websites such as 
Facebook and Twitter, regulating access and 
contents, and monitoring Internet use. But China’s 
censorship infrastructure also extends to include 
online espionage, regulatory tactics, and social 
pressure, as MacKinnon, a renowned Internet 
freedom advocate and former journalist, described:  
Cyber-attacks against activists, diss idents, and Chinese 
exiles could compromise their computer networks and 
email accounts. Device and network controls involve 
pre-installing information filtering and tracking 
mechanisms in computers and routers sold in China. 
Domain-name controls prevented ordinary individuals 
from registering Internet domain names ending in 
“.cn.” Localized disconnection and restriction referred 
to shutting down connections in specific locations  
entirely to ensure that locals cannot use the Internet 
or mobile phones to organize protests. Surveillance 
works through identity registration for Internet usage, 
monitoring software, and the compliance of Internet 
companies. The government proactively steers online 
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conversations through party members, government 
officials, and “fifty-cent party,” people paid to write 
posts  in favor of their employers. [23] 
Therefore, not only does the government controls 
the Internet hardware and software networks, it also 
imposes a special Internet police force to enforce the 
government’s censorship regulations [21,33].   
But the most effective effort at restricting 
information which emerges at the grassroots level, 
including chatrooms, microblogs, and online forums, 
perhaps come not from government’s surveillance, 
but self-censorship of information which 
organizations and individuals present to their users. 
Both domestic and foreign Internet corporations such 
as Google [6] and Yahoo [10] altered their search 
results to accommodate the state’s censorship 
requirements.  
And the Chinese government encourages self-
censoring entities to be thorough by intentionally 
keeping censorship regulations and guidelines 
generic and ambiguous. Roberts, a scholar studying 
censorship and propaganda in China, noted:  
It is illegal in China to write or distribute any 
information online that “harms the interest of the 
nation,” “spreads rumors or disturbs social order,” 
“insults or defames third parties,” or “jeopardizes the 
nation’s unity.” Punishments are similarly ambiguous 
and unevenly administered—violating online 
information laws could result in punishment as severe 
as jail-time to as trivial as having your account shut 
down or simply removing one offending social media 
post. The wide range of information that could qualify 
under these laws keeps online users in China guess ing 
as to what types of information are indeed off-limits 
and what types of punishment could be meted out for 
spreading the information. [28] 
By providing only highly abstract terms such as 
national interest, social order, and national unity,  the 
government affords itself more flexibility of 
interpreting and manipulating legal boundaries 
[3,21]. Thus, companies which stand to lose much in 
case of a regulatory misstep tend to deploy sweeping 
censoring mechanisms to block keywords, ban users, 
and delete infringing contents [13,21]. The extent of 
self-censorship may intensify during political events, 
for example, a case study of keyword blocking on 
Weibo reported that, during the 2012 National 
Congress election, Weibo actively manipulated and 
filtered the search results of certain government 
officials’ names [26]. Even citizens in Hong Kong 
were worried about the impact of censorship when 
they engaged in civic activities [19]. 
But despite popular beliefs, Chinese citizens still 
maintain a small degree of agency in speaking their 
minds,  as the censorship infrastructure was not 
designed to completely remove dissents on its 
Internet. In fact, the Chinese government had 
investigated citizens’ dissents which at times exposed 
corruption and malfeasance at lower level 
governments, which contribute to China’s effort at 
cracking down on corrupted officials [8]. Rather, a 
more important focus for its censorship apparatuses, 
than to completely eliminate anti-government 
discourses, are to prevent citizens’ collective 
mobilization and actions.  King, et al. examined 
deleted social media content on the Chinese Internet, 
arguing that China’s censorship is designed to silence 
comments which encouraged or organized social 
mobilization; and all forms of mobilization aimed at 
spurring offline collective actions were targeted 
regardless of their political inclinations [17]. Thus, 
Chinese citizens still have limited latitude to conduct 
political discourses, so long as they could 
successfully guess at the extent of permissible 
boundaries. 
So far, Chinese citizens’ reactions to the Chinese 
censorship apparatuses have been dialectically 
complicated. As censorship is continuously 
strengthened, Chinese are also making use of proxy 
servers and email to access restricted information 
[2,22,25]. And citizens have also discussed sensitive 
topics using substitute terms for blocked keywords 
[16,24]. For example, “ harmony和谐” refers to the 
ideology of social harmony proposed during Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s administration (2003-2013). 
People use “ river crab 河蟹,” a homophone of 
“ harmony 和谐,” to circumvent the block list of 
sensitive words [38]. Thus, Roberts suggested that 
the Chinese censorship not only had not deterred the 
spread of information, it emboldens Internet users to 
engage more actively in political writings [28].  
 
3. Related Work 
 
In their seminal work on infrastructure, Star and 
Ruhleder state that infrastructure is neither a tool or a 
substrate, but a fundamentally relational concept, 
which becomes real infrastructure in relation to 
organized practices [31]. Infrastructure has the 
following properties: embeddedness, transparency, 
reach or scope, learned as part of membership, links 
with conventions of practice, embodiment of 
standards, built on an installed base, becomes visib l e 
upon breakdown, and fixed in modular increments, 
not all at once or globally [30]. In many ways, 
China’s censorship shares such properties. It is sunk 
into and inside of the Internet infrastructure, the 
organizational arrangements of Internet companies, 
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technologies, and artifacts as basic as a router. It has 
reach beyond one single site. It is built upon the 
existing technical and social structure of the Chinese 
Internet. It is constructed gradually.  
However, China’s censorship also differs from 
the classic conceptualization of infrastructure in 
important ways. The design of artifacts often contain 
inscribed values [35]. In this case of censorship in 
China, it has been deliberately designed and 
maintained to control and restrict ordinary citizens, 
rather than to support and enable them in the way that 
a system of railroad tracks or a city water system 
function. It is sometimes transparent but other times 
visible when it functions in intended scenarios. It is 
learned as people repeatedly encounter and 
circumvent it.  The repressive nature of China’s 
censorship provides us a unique case to reflect upon 
the understanding of infrastructure. 
 
4. Method 
 
Our study belongs to a larger project investigating 
how Chinese citizens used digital technologies to 
understand and discuss political events in China. 
From April,  2014 to January, 2016, we conducted 32 
interviews with mainland Chinese citizens who were 
active posters of political events in China, and thus 
were aware of censorship parameters in China and 
had experience coping with it.    
We recruited our interviewees by first identifying 
Internet sites on which we are likely to find active 
political posters. We began by registering accounts 
on Weibo, the largest Chinese micro-blogging 
service. When a major political event broke out, we 
used these Weibo’s in-site search functions to search 
related keywords in order to locate online debates 
and conversations about this event, as well as people 
involved in these online discourses. And during the 
period of our investigation, three political events took 
center stage in these discussions; these include the 
Umbrella Movement, the National People’s 
Congress, and the crackdown on corruption. The 
Umbrella Movement was a pro-democracy 
movement that took place in Hong Kong from 
September, 2014 to December, 2014. The second 
event refers to the National People’s Congress’s 
annual session that happened in March, 2015. The 
third refers to the anti-corruption campaign led by Xi 
Jinping,  general secretary of the party, which started 
in 2012. 
We paid particular attention to online celebrities 
who showed concern for these political events by 
commenting or re-posting relevant content. These 
celebrities included scholars, media critics, 
economists, and journalists. We identified 20 
celebrities with the criteria of having one at least post 
that received over 100 comments. Figure 1 shows an 
example of a Weibo post with 1341 comments. We 
viewed each celebrity’s micro-blogging page as a site 
in an ethnographic sense, because each celebrity’s 
population of followers is relatively stable. 
Additionally, we also observed the same group of 
people commenting and debating in the comment 
area. We archived people’s conversations from the 
comment area. 
Through the posts of these 20 Weibo celebrities, 
we identified a pool of interview candidates who had 
posted multiple meaningful and thoughtful 
comments. We contacted these people through 
Weibo’s private messaging function to ask for an 
interview, from which we recruited 32 interviewees. 
Our 32 interviewees included 19 males and 13 
females between the ages of 18 and 46. They had 
diverse occupations, such as graduate student, 
government employee, editor, journalist, designer, 
engineer, programmer, freelancer, and stock 
manager. 
 
Figure 1. A Weibo Post. 
All these interviews were conducted in Chinese. 
We asked participants how they sought information 
regarding certain events and whether they 
experienced censorship during these events. We 
asked participants about attitudes towards censorship 
and why they felt as they did. We asked them to 
describe the situations in which they encountered 
censorship, and how they coped. We asked how they 
learned to circumvent censorship. With permission, 
we followed all the participants’ social media 
accounts. Some of them followed ours in reciprocity. 
The social media platforms included Weibo, and 
popular online forums such as tianya.cn and 
tiexue.net. On these platforms we observed and 
archived participants’ discussion with other social 
media users. 
The first author is a native Chinese speaker. All 
interviews and social media data were translated into 
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English by him. We use pseudonyms to protect our 
participants’ identity and anonymity. 
 
5. Data Analysis  
 
We adopted a grounded theory approach [5] to 
analyze interviews and online discussions. Firstly, we 
read all interview transcripts and used our initial 
understanding to produce a starting list of codes, 
which concern participants’ opinions about 
censorship or their strategies to cope with censorship. 
From there, we returned to the data to conduct a 
systematic analysis of the themes that emerged. After 
several iterations of coding, we identified three 
concrete methods that our participants used to resist 
the censorship infrastructure. The three methods are: 
switching between public and private channels, using 
machine unreadable message, and broadening 
information search. We then returned to our data set 
to find episodes [29] where participants described 
their strategies of resistance. We paid particular 
attention to their reasoning processes behind adopting 
a particular strategy. 
 
6. Findings  
 
In this section, we detailed participants’ strategies 
to navigate information allowed by censorship on the 
Chinese Internet. One, participants have used 
alternative backchannels. Two, they have presented 
information in creative ways. And three, they have 
pieced together information from multiple, local and 
foreign, sources to reassemble the complete picture. 
 
6.1. Reserving Sensitive Information for 
Private and Backchannel Discussion 
 
Most of our participants, from their experiences 
navigating the Chinese Internet, have perceived that 
the use of government censorship apparatuses is more 
evident on popular websites, as well as many-to-
many public channels (e.g. , Weibo). Their 
experiences with government censorship usually 
involved uninformed and sudden manipulation of 
public information, such as: they were suddenly 
unable to visit a particular news website; they could 
not enter a previously admissible keyword search 
term into a search field; they found particular content 
on social media to be deleted; and they saw 
suspicious comments which they believed were 
posted by paid commentators hired by the 
government. Through such in-situ experiences, 
Chinese Internet users observed and guessed at what 
is permissible by censorship, and learned what they 
should not say publicly. They kept this sensitive 
information off the public record and only to be 
shared through private backchannels, such as in 
instant messaging and private chats. For example, 
Ling, a magazine editor, said: 
I think the government only banned keywords in 
places where a lot of people can read and talk. When I 
used blogging services a while ago, I had to make sure 
there was no sensitive word in my articles each 
containing hundreds of words. However, I have never 
had to worry about this problem [word checking] 
when chatting in a private channel. 
QQ and WeChat are the most popular instant 
messaging tools in China [4]. Tianya.cn is one of the 
largest online forum. And Mingyue, a graduate 
student, said: 
They [the government and the owners of social media 
platforms] don’t really care about what we say in 
instant messaging tools  such as QQ and WeChat, or 
private chat on Weibo and tianya.cn. 
While the extent of Internet information which 
the Chinese government intends to censor remains 
unclear, Chinese users tended to believe censorship 
does not apply to private chat channels, as 
Zhongfeng, a 27-year-old designer, told us: 
It’s very hard to monitor all the private 
communication. There will be too much content to 
censor. Also in private chat we don’t type in formal 
Chinese, which makes censorship even harder to work. 
Under the pervasive surveillance, our participants 
generally perceived private channels to contain more 
reliable information than public channels, which 
tended to be generic and shallow. Thus, serious 
information seekers had often directly asked for 
information from people who they believed had 
sensitive information. For example, Baozi, a 20-year-
old college student, mentioned that he had friends 
who studied at Hong Kong during the period of the 
Umbrella Movement. He could often see his friends’ 
social media posts about the movement, such as 
pictures or related news report. He told us: 
Yeah, I initially learned about the movement from my 
friends’ posts  in WeChat’s Friend Circle. But they 
didn’t really post many details of the movement, 
except a few pictures and very brief comments. Maybe 
it is kind of sensitive to talk in the public. For example, 
if I asked a question in their posts ’ comment area, 
most likely they would answer briefly with some joking 
language. But I got really interested in this  and chatted 
with them privately, they began to talk a lot about 
their experiences with the movement, such as class 
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boycott activities and protesting in Hong Kong’s 
business district. 
Baozi found private channels to be more effective 
at obtaining information from his friends; he thus 
resorted to private channels in order to obtain a better 
picture. 
Our participants reported that in some social 
media circles, such as on Weibo, users were mostly 
willing to share information privately, even with 
strangers, so long as this happened away from public 
eye. Zhongfeng described this open mindset 
regarding Weibo information sharing: 
In Weibo discussions, I often come across  novel and 
insightful ideas that I have never heard before. Some 
of the ideas refer to sensitive information, such as the 
relationship between Hong Kong’s capitalists and high-
ranking central government officials. There will never 
be reports like this in the domestic media because of 
censorship. If I am interested in that piece of sensitive 
information, I will send a private message to the user 
and ask for it. Most of the time, the user is willing to 
share it. I do the same thing if I have certain sensitive 
information and another person asks for it. 
Zhongfeng’s story signified how Chinese Internet 
practices changed to develop new informational 
pathways (i.e.,  a network of private backchannels) 
which can partially counter the influence of the 
censorship infrastructure. This backchannel replaced 
normative participation in Habermas’ sense of public 
sphere [7,11], and traversed a longer and secured 
route perceived as off the censorship radar. We are 
unable to know the extent this information 
“ rerouting” diminishes public discourses, but what i s  
interesting is the emergence of consensus among 
Weibo users making such forms of information 
sharing plausible. Private and backchannel 
discussions signified how Chinese citizens came to 
understand the boundaries of Internet censorship and 
figure out the venues that the censorship 
infrastructure does not reach. 
 
6.2. Expre ssing in Machine Unreadable Ways 
 
A common perception among our participants 
was that many censorship mechanisms relied on basic 
keyword filtering techniques to manage the massive, 
ever-increasing amount of information that was being 
produced and circulated in the Chinese Internet. To 
counter this mechanism, participants attempted to 
make communications difficult to read or delete by 
either algorithms or human. For example, Zhongfeng 
believed that censorship mechanisms typically 
followed a set of simplistic reasoning, such as to 
identify a set of sensitive keywords: 
[The government’s] methods are relatively brutal, such 
as enforcing the sensitive word list. But you know, who 
really talk in formal language online? 
What Zhongfeng pointed out was also reported in 
previous studies on how Chinese users were able to 
use uncensored terms to express the same politicized 
meanings without being censored [27,34,37]. What is  
important here is that the Chinese users have evolved 
their Internet expressions in ways faster than 
censorship could keep up.  
One way which participants could bypass 
censorship was to render text as bitmaps, a form of 
content which current censorship mechanisms could 
not read (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Image-based Content. 
Yuming, a 23-year-old college student, enjoyed 
using images for opinion expression. He said: 
I absolutely love it. I can say something that would be 
deleted otherwise. I can also be more express ive with 
images, like using some interesting fonts or adding 
some Internet meme pictures. 
While it took effort to produce such images, 
participants found them useful when they deemed the 
content sensitive. 
The second way was to post sensitive information 
only on temporary “ throwaway” accounts [20]. While 
censorship could pick up accounts which have been 
posting sensitive information, and ban these 
accounts, it has yet to be able to trace the identity of 
the real user—if such person manages to move from 
one account to another. Here is an excerpt of a social 
media conversation: 
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Feitu: You are very knowledgeable. I will have to admit 
that I know little about the movement. Can you send 
some information to me through private messages if it 
is convenient for you? I want to know more. 
Wuhui: You should follow a Weibo account titled 
huaxia  (“华夏”). This person often publishes precise 
analysis , and I believe he knows a lot of sensitive 
information. However, Weibo often bans his account, 
probably because he leaks too much information. To 
counter account suspension from Weibo, he has 
created a primary Weibo account that regularly 
publishes his newly registered accounts. Once you 
have followed this account, he will tell you the name 
of his primary account in private messages. If you can 
follow his primary account, you will always know his 
latest Weibo account for leaking sensitive information. 
In this conversation, Wuhui talked about a 
successful approach employed by huaxia in which his 
master account was used to publish the usernames of 
throwaway accounts; and these throwaway accounts 
were used to publish sensitive information. His 
master account had never been banned since it did 
not directly post this information. Such approach 
outwitted the current censoring mechanism and 
allowed the audience to continue to receive sensitive 
information. 
The third way was to obtain information from 
lesser known websites. Participants pointed out that 
many websites which have been aggregating news 
from blocked foreign websites had published 
materials without the government knowledge. For 
example, qimila.com was a Chinese video sharing 
forum where people shared downloaded news videos 
from blocked foreign websites such as YouTube. 
These videos often involved sensitive topics in 
China. Another powerful website was Long Teng 
Wang (“龙腾网”) (www.ltaaa.com/), where Chinese 
citizens voluntarily translated and shared many 
countries’ reports about China, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan. Leiyu, a 21-year-old college student, 
highlighted the value of these aggregation websites:  
I often use a number of channels to obtain 
information. For example, search Long Teng Wang on 
the Internet. This is a translation forum… I know many 
powerful websites like this. Therefore, I do not rely on 
Weibo for information.  
Leiyu’s story signified the existence of alternative 
websites that allowed the access to rich content 
unseen in mainstream media sites, although in a 
much more complex way. 
 
6.3. Piecing the Puzzle Through Broad-based 
Information Search   
 
Despite having ways to circumvent and bypass 
censorship, our participants still found value in 
consuming censored information, especially if each 
piece of information contributes to forming the 
complete story. And our participants judged the value 
of censored information in the following ways.  
One, if the reported event was of little political 
value, its related news was likely to be accurate, as a 
participant said:  
For events with lower priority, I am fine with just 
reading the state media. I do not necessarily trust 
what the state media says. 
Two, even for strictly censored content on state 
media, our participants had found it useful to deduce 
the premise of that information being reported—by 
drawing on the circumstances in which the 
information is being presented. For example, Gushi, a 
46-year-old stock manager, said: 
I watch Xinwen Lianbo every day to inform my 
investment decisions. I try to infer which industry the 
central government favors. 
Three, when our participants read local censored 
news from different outlets, they could also identify 
subtle differences which complemented what each 
outlet had de-emphasized. And Mafei, a 29-year-old 
engineer, enjoyed reading a number of mainland-
based newspapers on a weekly basis. Due to China 
enforcing vague self-censorship regulations, each 
media outlet might interpret what is considered 
sensitive information differently. And he found a 
variety of competing opinions even on these media. 
He also considered social media such as Weibo and 
WeChat as complementary to state media. 
Finally, our participants looked beyond each 
information source by reading broadly, while piecing 
together different information to form a coherent 
picture. Some of them even gathered information 
from foreign sources, so as to form a more complete 
picture of social and political events. For example, 
Zhelu, a 37-year-old writer, watched state-owned 
television channels for daily entertainment and news. 
But he was also a 15-year customer of several Hong 
Kong television channels because of their alternative 
analyses of international and domestic affairs. He 
also logged on to Facebook and T witter, via VPN,  t o 
learn about his Western friends’ opinions.  While 
acknowledging the quality of information they 
obtained from Western sources, our participants also 
stressed that even foreign-based and Western news 
media have their biases, as Leiyu commented: 
Knowing each media’s pros and cons and taking 
advantage of this knowledge is necessary to 
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understanding what’s really going on in an event. In 
the end, if you do enough homework, censorship 
won’t matter much. 
By developing a rich understanding of each 
media’s pros and cons, our participants developed 
their own taxonomies of media outlets—with their 
complementary biases and perspectives—in order to 
piece the puzzles of political biases on the Internet. 
Participants were confident that censorship could not 
stop them from obtaining desired information.  
 
7. Discussion 
 
We reported a qualitative study of a group of 
Chinese citizens’ practices of resisting censorship 
that is pervasive in the Chinese Internet. Our 
participants utilized many different strategies at 
circumventing, outwitting, and looking beyond 
censored information. For example, they learned 
what information was best conveyed in private 
instant messaging, rather than an online forum. Some 
Weibo users even developed trust with each other in 
relaying information through private messaging. 
Other such social practices include the use of non-
machine readable images and news aggregate with 
deductive reasoning. Through these social practices, 
the citizens were able to broaden their information 
accessibility beyond what is prescribed by 
censorship. Next we will discuss how this case study 
might advance our understanding of the censorship 
infrastructure as well as infrastructural resistance. 
 
7.1. Characterizing Repressive Infrastructure 
 
Previous studies have primarily examined 
infrastructures designed to enable people and serve 
society [1,12,31]. China’s censorship presents a 
unique case where a sophisticated system has been 
built and maintained at a national scale with the sole 
purpose of controlling and limiting every ordinary 
citizen.  
The censorship infrastructure possesses a few 
unique characteristics. First, its goal is to set 
boundaries, rather than to support and to empower. In 
order to do so, the censorship infrastructure operates 
in a top-down manner. The central government sends 
out orders and decisions while corporations and 
government agencies execute these instructions.   
Second, it becomes visible whenever people cross 
the boundaries, such as searching a sensitive keyword 
or visiting a blocked site. 
Third, the censorship infrastructure is meant to be 
opaque. No ordinary citizen should know its 
standards and mechanism. Our participants might 
observe a blocked foreign website or a forbidden 
search engine keyword. However, they would never 
know the precise list of blocked websites or the 
sensitive keyword list. Remaining an opaque artifact, 
the infrastructure could easily extend its influence 
beyond its reach, since participants could not be 
completely certain whether they were being watched. 
Internet companies are likely to censor more than 
they have to in order to limit their exposure to 
regulatory infringements. 
The well-known existence of such a massive 
repressive infrastructure might be possible in 
centralized regimes that are able to execute top-down 
methods of control, with the compliance of 
companies and organizations.  However, repressive 
infrastructures might exist at varied scales in different 
societies, only becoming visible when they 
malfunction in an unexpected way, as evidenced by 
the Snowden case and NSA’s massive surveillance 
effort [9]. Additionally, there might be a repressive 
side of our everyday infrastructures. Such concern 
increases when infrastructures fall into private hands 
that are not subject to public eyes. The infrastructure 
that ordinary citizens rely on for information and 
news consumption is worth research attention [18]. 
For example, Internet companies such as Google, 
Twitter, and Facebook are gaining enormous power 
in today’s internet infrastructure, as a substantial 
portion of the Internet traffic flows through these 
Internet giants’ sites [36]. Google, for example, has 
been frequently cited for its discriminating 
algorithms [14,15]. Facebook was reported to 
manipulate its trending topics to favor the 
Democratic Party in the US [32]. 
Studying repressive infrastructure can be 
challenging. In this study, there has been no open, 
official documentation regarding how censorship is 
implemented and maintained, what entities 
participate, and what technologies are designed and 
utilized. Therefore, we were hardly able to follow 
Star’s recommendations [30] to identify master 
narratives or surface invisible work. Instead, we 
analyzed people’s encounters and experiences with 
censorship, as well as their interpretations of how 
censorship worked. The secretive nature of such 
infrastructure and the proper approach to it are worth 
further investigation by infrastructure researchers. 
 
7.2. Understanding Infrastructural 
Resistance 
 
Much learning took place as Chinese citizens 
became used to the pervasiveness of censorship. 
They had to learn the advantages and disadvantages 
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of different venues. Because of the opaqueness of 
censorship, participants mostly built knowledge 
through incidental observations of censorship as well 
as chatting with other citizens.  
Participants’  infrastructural resistance involved 
three parties—companies developing authoritative 
mechanisms with over-reaching censorship, the 
censorship authority imposing vague censorship 
regulations with hidden boundaries, and citizens 
performing resistance by pushing informational 
boundaries presented. The nature of this resistance is 
not to disregard the entirety of government’s 
censorship, but to navigate the gray areas between 
“ censored information” and the “ level of information 
(actually) permissible by censorship.” Citizens make 
use of social media to access and transmit 
information beyond what was permissible by 
censorship. Yet, information that has been shared by 
overriding intents and designs of censorship may not 
have exceeded what the government intend on 
suppressing. As discussed by Roberts [28], and also 
mentioned by our participants, the extent of Chinese 
government censorship may be aimed at disallowing 
public gatherings and collective actions, and perhaps 
for this reason, the censorship apparatuses had not 
been extended to less popular websites and instant 
messaging tools. 
Participants’  infrastructural resistance was a 
collaborative effort that involved both friends and 
strangers. Participants had friends who located 
outside the censorship infrastructure and had easy 
access to sensitive information. They also felt free to 
ask strangers for information. Participants were 
confident that, as long as they have access to the 
Internet, they will be able to find any desired 
information by collaborating and communicating 
with other people. We attribute such confidence to 
the ubiquitous Internet infrastructure that is 
composed of various ways of communication and 
massive numbers of organizations and people. 
Embedded in the Internet infrastructure, repressive 
infrastructures do not have absolute control over 
information and resistance is possible. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we reported a qualitative study of a 
group of Chinese citizens coping with China’s 
Internet censorship infrastructure. By analyzing 
participants’ three concrete strategies to navigate the 
censored Chinese Internet, we were not stating that 
such strategies were common and usual among our 
participants. Moreover, we do not see repression as 
the only characteristic of China’s censorship. Rather, 
the paper is intended to explore the relationship 
between resistance, repression, and infrastructure, 
without either supporting or denouncing censorship. 
We showed how a repressive censorship 
infrastructure worked as participants experienced it,  
as well as how infrastructural resistance was possible 
through individual agency and social collaboration. 
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